We introduce a game-theoretic model of diffusion of technologies, advertisements, or influence through a social network. The novelty in our model is that the players are interested parties outside the network. We study the relation between the diameter of the network and the existence of pure Nash equilibria in the game. In particular, we show that if the diameter is at most two then an equilibrium exists and can be found in polynomial time, whereas if the diameter is greater than two then an equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist.
Introduction
Social networks such as Facebook and Twitter are modern focal points of human interaction. The pursuit of insights into the nature of this interaction calls for a game-theoretic analysis. Indeed, a number of papers (see, e.g., [5] ) investigate variations on the following setting. The social network is represented by an undirected graph, where the vertices are users and edges connect users who are in a social relationship. Suppose, for example, that there are several competing applications, e.g., voice over IP systems, that are not interoperable. The users play a coordination game, where if two neighbors adopt the same system they get some reward that is based on the inher-ent quality of the system. The goal is to study the diffusion of technologies through the social network. The point of view here is completely decentralized, and the players in the game are the users of the social network.
We propose a different, global point of view regarding the incentives that govern the diffusion process. Suppose we have several firms that would like to advertise competing products via "viral marketing". Each firm initially targets a small subset of users, in the hope that the rumor about its product would spread throughout the network. However, a user that adopts one product is reluctant to adopt another, hence the campaign of one firm negatively affects the success of another firm's campaign. To the best of our knowledge our model is the first game-theoretic model to deal with the incentives of interested parties outside the social network. Note that some previous papers did consider the problem of choosing an influential set of users as an optimization problem (see, e.g., [6] ), but not in a competitive game-theoretic setting. Other papers, which deal with Voronoi games on graphs, provide a game-theoretic study of a static facility location problem where each vertex is assigned to the closest agent and the utility of an agent is the number of vertices assigned to it (see, e.g., [3, 7] ). In our model, in contrast, vertices are assigned to agents based on a more complex diffusion process rather than solely on the basis of their distance from the agents.
The model
Let G = V , E be an undirected graph. Furthermore, let N = {1, . . . ,n} be the set of agents (the interested parties). The diffusion process unfolds as follows. There are n + 2 colors: a color for each agent i ∈ N, as well as two addi- A white vertex that has two neighbors colored by two distinct colors i, j ∈ N is colored gray. In other words, we assume that if two agents compete for a user at the same time they "cancel out" and the user is removed from the game. The process continues until it reaches a fixed point, that is, all the remaining white vertices are unreachable due to gray vertices. See Fig. 1 for an illustration of the diffusion process.
A game Γ = G, N is induced by a graph G, representing the underlying social network, and the set of agents N. The strategy space of each agent is the set of vertices V in the graph, that is, each agent i selects a single node that is colored in color i at time 1. Note that if two or more agents select the same vertex at time 1 then that vertex becomes gray. A strategy profile is a vector x = x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ V n , where x i ∈ V is the initial vertex selected by agent i. We also denote
Given a strategy profile x ∈ V n , the utility of agent
, is the number of nodes that are colored in color i when the diffusion process terminates. For instance, in the example given in Fig. 1 the utility of each of the agents is two. A strategy profile x is a (pure strategy)
Nash equilibrium of the game Γ if an agent cannot benefit from unilaterally deviating to a different strategy, i.e., for 
Our results

Given a graph
Our investigation focuses on the relation between the diameter of the graph and the existence of Nash equilibria in the induced diffusion game. Indeed, if we can find a Nash equilibrium then we can often predict the behavior of the agents and the outcome of this competitive diffusion process, or, alternatively, advise the agents how to play. Our first theorem is the following.
Theorem 2.1. Every game Γ = G, N where D(G) 2 admits a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, an equilibrium can be found in polynomial time.
Note that a random graph on n labeled vertices where each edge appears with probability p, usually denoted G(n, p), has diameter at most two with high probability whenever p (c ln n)/n for c > 2 (see, e.g., [2] for more details about the diameter of random graphs). In particular (by taking p = 1/2) almost all graphs over n vertices have diameter at most two. Finally, social networks typically have a very small diameter. Therefore, it can be argued that assuming a diameter of two is not very restrictive.
It is now natural to ask whether the existence of Nash equilibria can also be guaranteed for diameters larger than two. It is not too difficult to construct a graph with diameter four that does not admit an equilibrium. Our second theorem gives a negative answer even with respect to diameter three. The construction in the proof of Theorem 2.2 can easily be extended to a larger number of agents or to any (finite or infinite) diameter greater than three.
Discussion
In order to facilitate the game-theoretic analysis we consider a very simple model of diffusion. In particular, conflicts are deterministically resolved by introducing gray vertices, and each agent initially selects just one vertex.
Richer (probabilistic) models of diffusion through a social network exist in the literature, e.g., [6, 4] . On the other hand, the assumption of discrete time steps is quite common.
Theorem 2.1 implies that with high probability a random graph (even a relatively sparse one) induces a game that admits a Nash equilibrium. However, social networks are normally not completely random, but rather often exhibit structure. Ideally one would be able to extend our result by showing that under a convincing random graph model of social networks (see, e.g., [1, 9] ) the induced game admits a Nash equilibrium with high probability.
Proofs
We begin by proving Theorem 2.1; we subsequently discuss some implications of the proof. 
Proof. If D(G)
1 then the graph is a clique and the theorem follows trivially. Therefore, we may assume that
, that is, the number of pairs with distance one from each other. Furthermore, denote the neighborhood of ver-
It is sufficient to show that for every x ∈ V n , i ∈ N, and
(1) Indeed, given Eq. (1) it clearly holds that any strategy profile x ∈ V n that maximizes Φ(x) must be a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, in order to find one such profile we may start from some preference profile, and in each step attempt to find a profitable deviation for one of the agents. We terminate if there is no such deviation (which, by definition, means that we have found a Nash equilibrium). This algorithm terminates after a polynomial number of steps since Φ(x) is bounded from above by n|V |+n 2 for every x, and by Eq. (1) every profitable deviation by an agent increases the value of the potential function by at least one. We turn to proving Eq. (1) . If the diameter of the graph is two then vertices can only be colored by an agent i ∈ N at time 1 or 2. Specifically, the vertices colored by agent i are roughly the vertices in the neighborhood of x i that are not neighbors of x j for some j ∈ N \ {i} (since these vertices are either gray or colored by j). Formally, define
Assuming that x i = x j for all i = j, the utility of agent i under the strategy profile x ∈ V n is
where χ A i is the indicator function that returns 1 if x ∈ A i and 0 otherwise. The rightmost term is required since even if x i is a neighbor of some x j , it is still colored by agent i at time 1, but is nevertheless included in the middle term.
Since χ A i is a Boolean function, this implies that
We distinguish between two cases. If Eq. (3) holds as a strict inequality then
deviation of a single agent can decrease the number of adjacent pairs of agents by at most n − 1, i.e., P (x i ,
Otherwise, Eq. (3) holds as an equality, and hence
That is, agent i has no neighbors among x −i under x i but has at least one neighbor under x i . Thus the number of neighbors of agent i increases and the number of neighbors of agents j ∈ N \ {i} does not decrease, i.e., P (x i , x −i ) > P (x). We conclude that
This establishes Eq. (1), and hence completes the proof of the theorem. 2
What the proof of Theorem 2.1 essentially shows is that when the diameter of the graph is two the diffusion game is a potential game [8] ; specifically, a function that satisfies (1) is known as a generalized ordinal potential function. Potential games have the property that better response dynamics converge to a Nash equilibrium; in other words, if at every stage the agents simply behave myopically, that is, some agent deviates to a more profitable strategy, then they will eventually reach an equilibrium.
We are now ready to prove our second theorem. Proof. We first give our construction, then establish that it has diameter three and that it does not admit a Nash equilibrium.
The construction. Let G = V , E be defined as follows. The vertices of the graph are
The edges of the graph are defined as follows. Each C i , for i = 1, 2, 3, is a clique. There is an edge v 1 , u for every
An illustration of the graph G is given as Fig. 2 .
We refer to the vertices v 1 , . . . , v 6 as hubs; we say that Note that the construction is essentially symmetric with respect to the hubs.
G has diameter 3. Using Fig. 2 , it is easy to verify that G has diameter 3. For example, a path from v 1 to u ∈ C 32 is given by v 1 → w → v 3 → u, where w ∈ C 11 . A path from u ∈ C 13 to w ∈ C 24 is given by u → v 1 → x → w, where x ∈ C 21 .
G does not admit a Nash equilibrium. We consider strategy profiles x 1 , x 2 ∈ V 2 for the two agents. The symmetries of our construction allow us to restrict our attention to six cases. 
